

# What do sessions have?

Each side of each session:


- Session ID (both public keys, sorted and hashed)
- A keypair (public key, private key)
- Import / export table
- A gift table

Alice sending a message to Bob


( ← bob 'say-hello carol)

# Terminology

- **Gifter** Who is giving the handoff (A in this case)
- **Receiver** Who is getting the reference (B in this case)
- **Exporter** Location of gift (C in this case)




# Machine A depositing a gift on C (for B)



```
(← <C-bootstrap-refr> 'deposit-gift 25  
<carol-refr>)
```

```
(op:deliver-only  
  (desc:export 0)  
  ('deposit-gift  
    25  
    (desc:export 56)))
```

# Machine A sending certificate to B



# Certificate


<code>(desc:handoff-give</code>	Certificate
<code>recipient-key</code>	B's public key in A ↔ B
<code>exporter-location</code>	Machine address to C
<code>session</code>	Session ID for A ↔ C session
<code>gifter-side</code>	Machine A's public key in A ↔ C session
<code>gift-id)</code>	ID of gift (carol) in C's A ↔ C gift table

# Certificate that's on the wire

```
(desc:sig-envelope Signed envelope wrapping message
  (desc:handoff-give Certificate
    <B-key-of-AtoB>
    "ocapn://machine-c.foo"
    AtoC-session
    A-key-of-Ato-C
    25) The ID where A left the gift on C for B
    <signature-by-A-key-of-AtoC>) The signature of the desc:handoff-give
```




# What does Machine B do with the certificate?



# What does B do with the certificate?

- Gives Bob a promise which eventually will resolve to Carol
- Establishes connection to machine C (if one doesn't exist)
- B makes a `desc:handoff-receive` based on the certificate
- B gives the `desc:handoff-receive` to machine C's bootstrap object



# What is a desc:handoff-receive?

(desc:handoff-receive

receiving-session    B ↔ C session

receiving-side        B's key in B ↔ C session

handoff-count        Integer to prevent replay attacks

signed-give)         Certificate a.k.a handoff-give

(desc:sig-envelope

(desc:handoff-receive

<BtoC-session>

**receiving-session:** Name of session in B ↔ C

<B-key-of-BtoC>

**receiving-side:** The B's public key in B ↔ C

4

**handoff-count:** Integer to prevent replay attacks

(desc:sig-envelope

**signed-give:** Same certificate & signed envelope

(desc:handoff-give

<B-key-of-AtoB>

**recipient-key:** B's public key in A ↔ B

"ocapn://machine-c.foo"

**exporter-location:** Machine address to C

AtoC-session

**session:** Session ID for A ↔ C session

A-key-of-AtoC

**gifter-side:** A's public key in A ↔ C

25)

**gift-id:** key in A ↔ C's gift table

<signature-by-A-key-of-AtoC>))

Signature A made using their key in A ↔ C

<signature-by-B-key-of-AtoB>)

Signature B has made using their A ↔ B key

# Identify which session

(sig-envelope

(handoff-receive

<BtoC-session>

<B-key-of-BtoC>

4

(sig-envelope

(handoff-give

<B-key-of-AtoB>

"ocapn://machine-c.foo"

**AtoC-session**

A-key-of-AtoC

25)

<signature-by-A-key-of-AtoC>))

<signature-by-B-key-of-AtoB>)

# Check the signature on the cert

```
(sig-envelope
```

```
(handoff-receive
```

```
<BtoC-session>
```

```
<B-key-of-BtoC>
```

```
4
```

```
(sig-envelope
```

```
(handoff-give
```

```
<B-key-of-AtoB>
```

```
"ocapn://machine-c.foo"
```

```
AtoC-session
```

```
A-key-of-AtoC
```


```
25)
```

```
<signature-by-A-key-of-AtoC>))
```

```
<signature-by-B-key-of-AtoB>)
```

This is signed using the public key of A in the A ↔ C session.

This proves that A is the A, c thinks they are and that they did in fact make this certificate.



# Check the signature on the handoff-receive

```
(sig-envelope
```

```
(handoff-receive
```

```
<BtoC-session>
```

```
<B-key-of-BtoC>
```

```
4
```

```
(sig-envelope
```

```
(handoff-give
```

```
<B-key-of-AtoB>
```

```
"ocapn://machine-c.foo"
```

```
AtoC-session
```

```
A-key-of-AtoC
```


```
25)
```

```
<signature-by-A-key-of-AtoC>))
```

```
<signature-by-B-key-of-AtoB>)
```

Check the signature on the **handoff-  
receive** using the key provided by A in the  
**handoff-give**.

This proves to C that that B is the B that  
machine A thinks B is and that B really did  
make this **handoff-  
receive**






# What does C do with the certificate

- After C checks that the certificate is valid, C knows:
  - A in the  $A \leftrightarrow C$  relationship actually did give B in the  $A \leftrightarrow B$  relationship the certificate
  - B, who is presenting this to C is the same B that A thinks B is
  - This isn't being replayed

# What does C do with the certificate

- C gets the gift at `gift-id` left for B in the A ↔ C gift table
- It exports this gift to B



# B gets the reference to Carol from C

- B fulfills the promise B gave to Bob.

